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BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCES-DEDUCTION OF NEW CREDITS.-IN RE SOL-
DOSKY ET AL., III FED. 511, (MINN.), AND IN RE SOUTHERN OVERALLS MFG.
Co., iii: Fed. 518, (Ga.).The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Section 6o c. entitles
a creditor who has received preferential payment on account, but who has
ixtended further credit as therein specified, to a deduction of the amount of
such new credits from the preferences that he would otherwise be required to
surrender before proving the remainder of his debt, and is not limited in its
application to cases where the trustee sues to recover the preferences.
The question involved in these two cases is a very important one, and one
over which there has been much conflict of authority. Until the present decis-
ions the authorities were evenly divided. The following cases supporting the
above two, hold that Section 6o c. of the bankruptcy act was enacted for the
benefit of all creditors who had received preferences and given the bankrupt
further credit. In re Ryan, io5 Fed. 76o; McKey v. Lee, 1O5 Fed. 923; In re
Deckler, io6 Fed. 484. That Section 6o c. applies only to creditors, who have
received preferences in bad faith, is held by In re Christensen, ioi Fed. 8o2;
In re Arndt, 104 Fed. 234; In re Keller, io9 Fed. I8; In re Oliver, io9 Fed.
784.-
BANKRUPRCY-PROVABLE CLAIMS-PEFERENCES.-IN RE KELLER, io9 Fed.
II8 (Iowa).-When a creditor receives a partial payment from an insolvent
debtor within four months prior to his bankruptcy, such payment constitutes
a preference, which must be surrendered by the creditor, before he will be
allowed to prove his debt against the bankrupt's estate, without regard to the
knowledge or belief by either debtor or creditor of the debtor's insolvency at
the time of payment.
The question here at issue has been differently decided by the federal
courts, a similar case not yet having been tried out before the Supreme Court.
The weight of authority, if not of reason, seems to hold a different view from
that in the decision above. In re Ratliff io7 Fed. 8o; In re Eggert, 98 Fed.
843; In re Smoke, 104 Fed. 289; In re Hall, 4 Am. Banks, R. 671; In re Alex-
ander, io2 Fed. 464. The present case is supported by In re Sloan, io2. Fed.
116; In re Fort Wayne Electric Corpus., 99 Fed. 4oo; In re Couliam, 97 Fed.
923.
CARRIERs-ExPULsIoN OF PASSENGER-ROUND TRIP--STAMPING RETURN
TICxEr.-SOUTHERN Ry. Co. v. WooD, 39 S. E. 894 (Ga.).-Where a
round-trip ticket provides that the return coupon should not be good unless it
was properly stamped by its agent, and where the railroad company failed to
furnish an agent at reasonable times, held, that a purchaser of such ticket, upon
explanation of the facts to the conductor, is entitled to ride upon any proper
train, and has a right of action in tort against the railroad company for his
expulsion.
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There is a radical conflict of authority as to the liability of the carrier for
the ejection of a passenger who tenders an invalid ticket, the invalidity of
which is due to the negligence of the carrier's agents. Many courts hold that
under such circumstances a passenger cannot recover for his ejection, but that it
is his duty to leave the train, and bring his action 'simply for the actual dam-
ages arising from the breech of contract in failing to provide him with a proper
ticket. Westeri- M. R. Co. v. Stocksdale, 34 At1. 88o (Md.); Pouilin v. Ry. Co.,
52 Fed- 197; Hufford v. Ry. Co., 53 Mich. 158; Townsend v, Ry. Co., 56 N. Y.
295; Cloud v. Ry. Co., 14 Mo. App. 136. The decided weight of authority,
however, is that a passenger may maintain an action in tort for his expulsion,-
and is not limited to an action on his contract. N. P.' Ry. Co. v Panson, 70
Fed. 585; Head v. Railway CO., 79 Ga. 358; SIoane-v. So Cof.iR. Co., III Col.
668;,JHubbard v. Ry. Co., 64 Mich. 63i; Ellsworth Y. R. Co., 63 WN W. 5 84;
Penn. R. Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PRoTECTION OF THE LAW-STATUTE LI=IT-
INqG CHARGES 'FOR TIe USE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.-COTTING V. GODARD, 22 Sup.
Ct. 3o.--The Kansas Legisla tire enacted that no stock- yard company doing
business above a certain amount should charge in excess of a certain rate on
each h' ad of stock passing through its yards. 'Held, the Act was Unconstitu-
tional.
Justice Brewer's opinion -showed that' there 'was no question Is' to the
reasonableness of the limitation, but based his opinion on iwo grounds; first, thaf
equal protection of the law would be denied the Kansas City Stock 'Yark Co.
inasmuch as it was the only concern doing business of an amount provided for
in the Act, and secondly, that this business is pnot of a class in which the public
has such. an interest as to warrant a reasonable limitation, of charges by the
legislature. justice, Brewer here discloses a refinement of the 'doctrine as laid
down in Munn Y Illnois, g4 U. S. in declaring that this right of the legisla-
ture to put a, reasonable limit on the charges of a business in which the' pub-
lic has an interest, is, confined to those cases in which the pubi has come
to have this interest because the work is such as is usually performed by the
state by aid of eminent domain and without a view of profit, in the mercantile
sense, ,and that a 'private individual'undertaking Such work impliedly agrees
to subject himself 'to such control. '
"-CONSTITUTIO1TXL LAW-LAw' oR CUSTODY OF INSANE PERSONS-IN
, RE'
LxAmiERT, 66 Pac. 85 1-(Cal.)__The'insanity law of 1897 authorized the judge
of a superior court on the application -of'a relative or friend '-of; an' alleged
insane Lperson for his comrimitment to a'hospital, accompanied by a certificate
of lunacy signed by two medical examiners, to forthwith determine the ques-
tion of insanity and immediately commit the person to a hospital. Held, to be
void,' as depriving a- person of his liberty "without due process of law."
Gaioutte,-J.,dissenting.
While this-decision renders entirely void the Insanity Law of 4897, intend-
ed to be a ;complete revision of insanity legislation, yet it is to be commended
for its justice. , Contrasted.with the New York law, this act made no provis-
ion for giving the alleged insane personi notice and an opportunity to be'
heard. The court in its opinion follows the law as laid down in New' York
that absence of such provisions is fatal. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 188.
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CORPOaTINs--FORIGxr-ACTioN AGAINST-FENNE-Bo0XER v. NORTHERX
PAC..Ry. Co., 66 Pac. 826 (Idaho).-Held, that a foreign corporation doing
business in a state does not acquire a fixed residence in that state by designat-
ing an agent upon whom process may be served as required by statute-
This case well illustrates the development of corporation law.v In the
former case of Easley v. Ins. Co., 38 Pac. 405, which -is here expressly over-
ruled, it was held that a foreign corporation could acquire a fixed, residence,
within the state for the purpose of suing and being sued. This was also the'
conclusion in N. T. v. Southern -Pac. Ry.. Co., 47 Fed, 297. But, as shown in
Shaw v. M ining Co., 145 U. S. 444 and the recent case of U. S. v- Schotter
11o Fed., XI Y. L. Joua.VFD the better opinion now is that a, foreign corpo-
ration cannot acquire such residence in another, state.'
CORPORATIONS-UNPAID SuBscRiPTIoNs-RrGHTs OF CORPORATION. CREDIT-
ORs.-HAWvKINS v. DONNERBERG, 66 Pac. 69i- (Or.).-A subscription agreement
specified that the capital stock should be paid for within a definite time but
more than six years- had elapsed-without payment. Held, that the creditors
of the corporation could not enforce- the liability of stockholders for unpaid
subscriptions after the- corporation's right to collect such subscriptions had.
become barred by the statute of limitations.'
This conclusion rests on the theory forcibly stated in So. -Carolina Mfg.
Co. v. Banik of State, 6 Rich. Esq. 227, that as against the shareholder -the
creditor's only equity is to be subrogated to' thd rights of the corporation.
Hence, if the rights of the corporation are lost or their action' barred, the
creditor is without remedy. But the celebrated case of 'Wood v. Drummer,
3 Mason 3o8, Fed. Cas. No,. I7,944, and those following it, as Payne -v. Bul-
lard, 23 Miss. 88, are not in accord with this view. This latter line of de-
cisions supports the more equitable doctrine that unpaid -stock subscriptions
constitute a trust fund held by the stockholders for the payment of the debts
of the corporation.
CRIMINAL LAw-AccUSATION OF CRimE-FAIL-uRE TO DENi--EvIDENCE-
PEOPLE V. AuGUR, 66 Pac: 794' (Cal). -Defendant, after his' arrest; was
brought to the bedside of the decedent, who identified him as the man who
shot him. The defendant- fully 'understood the accusation but made no reply
or denial. Held, that though defendant was under arrest, 'evidence of such
failure was admissible. - - - -
This conclusion cannot be accepted as good law. In other states {t has
been held that silence of a' person under arrest when accused of crime'is not
admissible as evidence against him, as such a person is not free to speak.' It
was so held in the leading'case of Com. v. Kenney, 12 Metc. '(Mass.) 235; and
this has been followed not only in Massachusetts but in Texas, Missouri and
other states.
CRIMINAL LAw-FoRMER JEOPARDY-DIsCHARGE OF JuRy--WAIVER-SIL-
ENCE OF PRISONER-Ex PARTE GLENN, III Fed. 257 (W. Va.).--Where a pris-
oner was once tried for -felony -by a regularly impaneled jury, which failed
to -agree and was discharged by the Court without the- prisoner's -consent or
objectidn and without any actual necessity being shown; 'held,' that- the prison-
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er's failure to object did not constitute a consent to the jury's discharge, and
that a retrial was unconstitutional, being in violation of the fifth amendment.
There seems to be a diversity of opinion as to when and under what cir-
cumstances a disagreement by a jury will bar a second trial. Some courts
hold as in the present case in regard to waiver of a constitutional right.
Caucemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 129; State v. Hodkins, 35 W. Va. 250. But in
People v. Curtis, 76 Cal. 57, and Morgan v. State, 3 Sueed (Tenn.) 475, it is
held that where the record does not show a discharge of the jury to have been
without the prisoner's consent, it will be presumed that the discharge was
with his consent. As to what constitutes a sufficient necessity and in what
cases a judge may use his discretion in discharging a jury without barring
a second trial see the following: Williams v. Com., 44 Am. Dec. 4o3; Page
v. State 3 Ohio St. 229; Cont. v. Tounsend, 5 Allen 216; State v. Honeysutt,
74 N, C. 391; People v. Jones, 48 Mich. 554; Green v. State, io Neb. 1o2;
Bishop's Criminal Law, Sections 1033-36.
EJECTMENT-TENANT OF LIFE TENANT-MORTGAGEE.-BARsoN ET AL. v-
MULLIGAN ET AL., 73 N. Y. Supp. 262.-Life tenant of certain premises leased
them to defendants who also purchased an overdue mortgage covering the
same. On death of life tenant, plaintiffs, the reversioners, without paying the
mortgage, brought ejectment to recover possession from defendants. Held,
defendants having gone legally into possession have right to remain as
mortgagees in possession, until their mortgage is paid. Van Brunt, P. J., and
Hatch, J., dissenting.
The position of the Court is that consent of mortgagor or judgment upon
the mortgage are not essential to constitute a party, a mortgagee in posses-
sion under the lien theory. Winslow V. McCall, 32 Barb. 241. Yet possession
must in every case originally be lawful. Russell v. Ely, 2 Black (U. S.) 575,
The decision is sound in reason even if it lacks precedent; as the dissenting
judges assert. Phyfe v. Riley, I5 Wend. 248.
EQUITY-JURISInIcnoN-PoLITIcAL QUESTIONS-ENOINING VIOLATION OF
NEUTRALITY RIGHTS.-PEARSON V. PARsON, io8 Fed. Rep. 461 (La.).-Private
persons asked for a bill to enjoin the shipment from a port of the United
States of alleged military supplies destined for use by Great Britain in the
war with the South African Republics. Held, that the questions involved
are entirely political, and can be dealt with only by the executive branch of the
government.
The complainants contended that by reason of the declaration of the
treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, relative to the "Alabama claims," in
which it was declared that: "A neutral government is bound not to permit
or suffer either belligerant to make use of its ports or waters as the base of
naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or
augmentation of military supplies or arms," they were entitled to invoke the
equity powers of this court to prevent such use. The court said that there
was nothing in this treaty, when its history and purposes were considered,
which would warrant the belief that the United States insisted upon inserting
therein a new principle of international law. It is a well established principle
of international law that private citizens of a neutral nation can lawfully sell
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supplies to a belligerant. This principle has long since been settled in this
country. Sanctissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 340, 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2nd
Ed.), p. I161.
FELLoW SERVANTS-INJURY To EmPLOYEE-NOTICE TO SHIFT Boss-No
NoTicE To MASTER-NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER-INcOMPETENCE OF SERVANT.-
WEEKS V. ScHARER, III Fed. 330 (Col.).-The plaintiff was injured owing
to the incompetence of a fellow servant, which incompetence had been reported
to a shift boss, who directed a gang of men and supervised their labor, but
who had no authority to hire or discharge employees. Held, that the plain-
tiff had no cause of action against his employer, since he and the shift boss
were fellow servants, and notice to the shift boss was not notice to the mas-
ter.
Courts have differed much as to when a superior was and when he was not
a fellow servant of an inferior. The present case reviews the decisions on this
subject, and draws from them these deductions, viz., that every superior
servant, charged with supervising the work of men under him, unless he is
authorized to hire or discharge them, is simply a fellow servant, for whose
negligence the master is not responsible, and further that only that agent or
officer, who has authority to select, discharge, or suspend the servants of his
master, may charge his master by his knowledge of their incompetence.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-SALE OF REAL ESTATE-SPEcIAL BOND-OMISSION
-VALIDITY OF SALE-HUGHES v. GOODALE, 66 Pac. 702 (Mont.).-By statute,
it is provided that a guardian authorized to sell real estate, must, before sale,
give bond to a probate judge. Held, that a sale by a guardian duly appointed
and qualified, but who ommitted to give the special bond required was not
void.
The provision that a sale bond shall be given is one of great importance
to the rights of the wards and it has been generally held that such a provision
is mandatory and not directory only, the bond being a condition precedent to
validity of sale. Am. & Eng. Enc., 3 ed. XV., p. 61; Williams v. Morton, 38
Me. 47. But some of the cases uphold the contrary view as expressed here.
Arrowsmith v. Harmonnig, 42 Ohio St. 254.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIAILITy OF CiTy-CoLUSlioN.-THE MAJOR
REYioLD, III Fed. 414 (Penn.).-A municipal corporation is liable in a court
of admiralty for a collision, caused by the negligence of its servants in charge
of an ice-boat, which it owned, and which was being operated under the direc-
tions of the corporation, it being immaterial whether such boat was employed
in a municipal service or under orders which were ultra vires.
It seems well settled in this country that in courts of law municipal cor-
porations are not liable for the negligence of its agents in doing acts ultra
vires. Thayer v. City of Boston, i9 Pick. 516; Smith v. City of Rochester,
76 N. Y. 5o6; Seele v. Deering, 79 Me. 343; Spring v. Hyde Park, I37 Mass.
554. This case, however, is brought in a court of admiralty, and the present
decision is based almost solely on Workman v. City of N. Y., 179 U. S. 552,
in which four of the judges dissented from the majority opin-
ion. That case decided that local decisions of a State Court
could not abrogate maritime law, and that where the relation of master
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and servant existed between the owner and master of a vessel, the owner even
though a municipal corporation was liable, under the rule of respondeat supe-
rior, for the negligence of his servants. See also The Sottawanna, 21 Wall.
572-74 and Butler v. Boston Steamship Co., 137 U. S. 527.
MORTGAGES-RFORMATION-MIsTAxE-DEscRIPTIoN op PROPFRTY-HER-
RING V. FITTS, 30 So. 804 (Fla.).-When a married woman, intending to con-
vey or mortgage her real estate, executes a proper instrument, in conjunction
with her husband, with all the formalities required by law, but by mistake an
erroneous description of the land is inserted, a court of chancery has power
to correct the mistake.
The authorities are in open conflict on this point. While this conclusion
is not without support, yet the majority of the courts seem to hold with
Williams v. Walker, 9 I. B. D. 576, that a married woman's deed, if it is
invalid at law is equally invalid in equity. But it is to be noted that this latter
rule is followed by the Florida court whenever a personal judgment on a con-
tract is'sought against a married woman. Dolliver v. Snow, I6 Fla. 86.
PARTITION-PARTIES-TENANTS I'T CoMMoN-ADvERsE CLAIMANTS.-SAT-
TERLEE V. KOBBE ET A., 72 N. Y. Supp. 675.-Plaintiff brought action for par-
tition against his co-tenants'and also made defendants six- others who
claimed title adversely. Held, persons claiming title to whole property adverse
to plaintiff and co-tenants cannot 'be made parties and compelled to litigate
their claims. McLennan, J., dissenting.
The tendency of legislation .is to alter the general equity rule and allow
adverse claimants to be made parties and questions of title to be tried in
partition suits. Thompson v. Holden, 117 Mo. 118; Martin v. Walker, 58 Cal.
59; Trainor v. Greenough, 145 Ill. 543. Several recent New York cases have
also taken the same position. Best v. Yeh, 82 Hun. 232.
TREATIES-PROCEEDINGS FOR RESTORATION OF DESERTING SEAMEN-TREATY
WITH GREAT BRITAIN-UNTED STATES V. KELLY, 1o8 Fed. Rep. 538 (Oregon.)
-Defendants forcibly took from the custody of a deputy United States Mar-
shall four men who had been adjudged deserters from an English ship by the
United States commissioner, who ordered the marshall to restore the deserters
to the ship under the direction of the British consul. Held, that the marshall
acted as the consul's agent, so that the defendants were not guilty of obstruct-
ing an offcer of he United States while attempting to execute a legal or judicial
writ.,
The treaty between the United States and Great Britain gives the British
consul power to require from the proper authorities the assistance provided by
law for the apprehension of deserting seamen. The only assistance provided
by law for this purpose is found in Section 528 of the Revised Statutes, which
gives the proper officer authority to deliver deserting seamen to the consul.
In this case, the marshall was in the execution of an order from the British
consul, which required him to restore the seamen to the master of the vessel,
a thing not within the power of the commissioner to order. The officer,
therefore, was obstructed, not in the performance of a duty enjoined by law,
but in the performance of an act directed by the British consul.
